excerts from Framed! by Christopher R. Martin
x - If you don't know much about labor unions, or if your main information source about them is the mainstream news media, it's easy to blame unions (or the Japanese, or recent immigrants, or some other scapegoat) for every bad working situation.
12 - Michael Parenti catalogued seven generalizations about the way the news media protray labor:
1. The larger struggle between capital and labor is ignored, making it possible to present labor struggles as senseless conflicts that could be solved if only the union would be willing to negotiate in good faith.
2. Company "offers" are emphasized, while company takebacks, employee grievances, and issues such as job security, health insurance, and safety are underplayed or ignored. As a result, workers appear irrational, greedy, and self-destructive.
3. While "fat" labor wages are reported, management compensation usually is not. Especially when workers are asked to make concessions, no coverage is typically given to management salaries, bonuses, and other perquisites.
4. The problems a strike has on the economy and public convenience are emphasized to the detriment of in-depth coverage on the cause(s) of the strike. Striking workers are thus portrayed as indifferent to the interests of the public's well-being.
5. Reports fail to consider the impact on the workers if they were to give up the strike and accept management's terms.
6. Instances of union solidarity and broader public support are rarely covered, eliminating the class dimension of a strike.
7. Governemntal agencies are cast as neutral entities upholding the public interest, yet the president, courts, and police often act to force workers back into production, protect private property, or guard strikebreakers.[25]
212 -- 25. Parenti, Inventing Reality. The list of seven generalizations paraphrases Parenti's list.
79 -- Plant closings in particular can lead to a breakdown in community cohersion and values and can foster an "anti-union animus," with the blame for the shutdown directed at the union, according to economists Bluestone and Harrison.[20]
84 -- So that the moral of the fable was not lost on the audience, Cummins concluded by remarking "the workers in Texas made concessions, and now they're celebrating." The fable of worker concessions framed stories at the New York Times as well. [. . .]
The convergence of a narrative frame that argued concessions were the key to success with the apparent acceptance of GM's statments that concessions did not matter created stories with high levels of contradictio. The same article also paraphrased the plant manager, who attributed the decision favoring Arlington to "labor peace." The unproblematic acceptance of the manager's statement suggest that doing nothing (what Willow Run workers did) is somehow a hostile (bad) posture, whereas voting to accept concessions (what Arlington workers did) is a peaceful (good) stance.
94 -- Meanwhile, in Arlington, Texas--as the national news media turned their eyes away--the prize of being the most flexible workforce slowly lost its luster. Texas newspapers such as the Dallas Morning News and Houston Chronicle, along with national media reports, had congratulated Arlington workers on their flexibility [. . .]
95 -- The editorial seem to be inspired by managerial textbooks. The phrasings are subtle, but illustrate that "teamwork," "cooperative spirit," and "flexibility," are often euphemisms for a "team" or "quality" organizational strategy in which a disciplined workforce ultimately accepts top-down managerial policies and unilateral sacrifices instead of truly participating in joint decision making.[59]
As it turned out for Arlington workers, the idea of being a flexible and concessionary workforce was more important than the actual concessions. The Arlington union local's vote to add a third shift was cited as the primary concession that won GM's favor. Yet, round-the-clock production was unnecessary for manufacturing GM's increasinglyunpopular large sedans. By 1996, production of the Chevy Caprice, Buick Roadmaster, and Cadillac Fleetwood sedans had slipped from two shifts to one. The sedan production at Arlington was phased out completely at the end of the year.
Keeping the Arlington plant open required winning a new GM product to build, and again it was the workers and community who were expected to make concessions. Gm proposed to convert the plant to truck production, investing $264 million to create what the automaker refers to as a "flex-build" plant. The plans called for reducing the union workforce from 1,900 to 1,350 and outsourcing many jobs to Lear Seating Corp. and Mackie Automotive Systems, to nonunion suppliers who would locate plants in Arlington. GM also proposed that it get city property tax abatements worth at lwast $11.7 million over ten years for its plant improvements (which it later received). Finally, GM said that it would commit to maintaining production at the Arlington plant for two years--until mid-1999--when Arlington would again be considered for shutdown.
97 -- But the story of "winning" a new product line for GM included selling out a new generation of workers at Mackie Automotive Systems and Lear Seating Corp., who assembled the same parts once done inside the Arlington plant but for less than half the wages. [. . .] these three hundred Mackie workers [. . .] frustrated by work conditions, medical and pension benefits, and a $6.50 starting wage, went on strike.
12 - Michael Parenti catalogued seven generalizations about the way the news media protray labor:
1. The larger struggle between capital and labor is ignored, making it possible to present labor struggles as senseless conflicts that could be solved if only the union would be willing to negotiate in good faith.
2. Company "offers" are emphasized, while company takebacks, employee grievances, and issues such as job security, health insurance, and safety are underplayed or ignored. As a result, workers appear irrational, greedy, and self-destructive.
3. While "fat" labor wages are reported, management compensation usually is not. Especially when workers are asked to make concessions, no coverage is typically given to management salaries, bonuses, and other perquisites.
4. The problems a strike has on the economy and public convenience are emphasized to the detriment of in-depth coverage on the cause(s) of the strike. Striking workers are thus portrayed as indifferent to the interests of the public's well-being.
5. Reports fail to consider the impact on the workers if they were to give up the strike and accept management's terms.
6. Instances of union solidarity and broader public support are rarely covered, eliminating the class dimension of a strike.
7. Governemntal agencies are cast as neutral entities upholding the public interest, yet the president, courts, and police often act to force workers back into production, protect private property, or guard strikebreakers.[25]
212 -- 25. Parenti, Inventing Reality. The list of seven generalizations paraphrases Parenti's list.
79 -- Plant closings in particular can lead to a breakdown in community cohersion and values and can foster an "anti-union animus," with the blame for the shutdown directed at the union, according to economists Bluestone and Harrison.[20]
84 -- So that the moral of the fable was not lost on the audience, Cummins concluded by remarking "the workers in Texas made concessions, and now they're celebrating." The fable of worker concessions framed stories at the New York Times as well. [. . .]
The convergence of a narrative frame that argued concessions were the key to success with the apparent acceptance of GM's statments that concessions did not matter created stories with high levels of contradictio. The same article also paraphrased the plant manager, who attributed the decision favoring Arlington to "labor peace." The unproblematic acceptance of the manager's statement suggest that doing nothing (what Willow Run workers did) is somehow a hostile (bad) posture, whereas voting to accept concessions (what Arlington workers did) is a peaceful (good) stance.
94 -- Meanwhile, in Arlington, Texas--as the national news media turned their eyes away--the prize of being the most flexible workforce slowly lost its luster. Texas newspapers such as the Dallas Morning News and Houston Chronicle, along with national media reports, had congratulated Arlington workers on their flexibility [. . .]
95 -- The editorial seem to be inspired by managerial textbooks. The phrasings are subtle, but illustrate that "teamwork," "cooperative spirit," and "flexibility," are often euphemisms for a "team" or "quality" organizational strategy in which a disciplined workforce ultimately accepts top-down managerial policies and unilateral sacrifices instead of truly participating in joint decision making.[59]
As it turned out for Arlington workers, the idea of being a flexible and concessionary workforce was more important than the actual concessions. The Arlington union local's vote to add a third shift was cited as the primary concession that won GM's favor. Yet, round-the-clock production was unnecessary for manufacturing GM's increasinglyunpopular large sedans. By 1996, production of the Chevy Caprice, Buick Roadmaster, and Cadillac Fleetwood sedans had slipped from two shifts to one. The sedan production at Arlington was phased out completely at the end of the year.
Keeping the Arlington plant open required winning a new GM product to build, and again it was the workers and community who were expected to make concessions. Gm proposed to convert the plant to truck production, investing $264 million to create what the automaker refers to as a "flex-build" plant. The plans called for reducing the union workforce from 1,900 to 1,350 and outsourcing many jobs to Lear Seating Corp. and Mackie Automotive Systems, to nonunion suppliers who would locate plants in Arlington. GM also proposed that it get city property tax abatements worth at lwast $11.7 million over ten years for its plant improvements (which it later received). Finally, GM said that it would commit to maintaining production at the Arlington plant for two years--until mid-1999--when Arlington would again be considered for shutdown.
97 -- But the story of "winning" a new product line for GM included selling out a new generation of workers at Mackie Automotive Systems and Lear Seating Corp., who assembled the same parts once done inside the Arlington plant but for less than half the wages. [. . .] these three hundred Mackie workers [. . .] frustrated by work conditions, medical and pension benefits, and a $6.50 starting wage, went on strike.
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